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CONSTRUCTING PARENTHOOD FOR STEPPARENTS: PARENTS BY
ESTOPPEL AND DE FACTO PARENTS UNDER THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
SARAH H. RAMSEY*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The nuclear family, consisting of a married, heterosexual couple and their
biological children, is still considered by many to be the preferred family form.
However, a large number of children are not living in families that fit the nu-
clear family model because they have multiple adults in parental roles. None-
theless, the nuclear family model is a powerful ideal and is used as a template to
exclude those who do not fit within its pattern.  Of those considered “parents,”
stepparents frequently fall outside this template and in disputes about children
are put on the scrap heap labeled third party claimants.  The American Law In-
stitute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution will salvage the parenthood of
a number of stepparents by expanding the definition of  “parent.” 1
The Principles adopt the theory that parenthood should be a non-exclusive
status when a child is not living in a nuclear family.2  Persons who fulfill paren-
tal functions are recognized as important contributors to a child’s well being,
even though they have no biological tie to the child.  The goal of this approach is
to lessen the harm to children caused by family separation or dissolution by pre-
serving child-parent attachments.3  The underlying premise for this approach is
that children are better off continuing contact with persons who have taken sig-
nificant parental roles.4  The implementation of this non-exclusive status uses
several decision rules: 1) deference to private ordering by parents; 2) modeling
the post-separation parental roles on the pre-separation parental roles; and 3)
rejection of the indeterminate best interest standard in favor of more determi-
nate rules.5
Copyright © 2001 by Sarah H. Ramsey.
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University. I am grateful for the very helpful suggestions of Les-
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1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 2
(Tentative Draft No.3, Part 1, 1998) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1998].
2. Categories of parents are defined in section 2.03.  See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Par-
enthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984) (contains an elaboration on the need for a broader concept of “par-
ent” in this context).
3. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02 cmt. e.
4. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.09(1)(h) (Tentative Draft No.4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 2000].
5. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02.
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The Principles endorse pluralism in family structure, allowing for multiple
models of “family.”  To a great extent a family’s form is defined by parents, with
deference given to those who fit the traditional definition of parent, namely
biological or adoptive parents.  Children, however, have little say in who is
deemed to be a parent or in defining their family, are not parties to proceedings,
have no standing to bring an action, 6 and have no right to be heard.7
This commentary focuses on families composed of two adults, living in an
intimate relationship, one of whom has a child from a prior relationship—a
typical stepfamily form.8  This commentary uses an expanded definition of step-
family that includes cohabitation as well as remarriage.9  It is necessary to use
this expanded stepfamily definition because an increasing number of children
are being brought up by unmarried-couple stepfamilies, particularly in families
of color, low-income, or gay and lesbian families.  Taking a broader and more
inclusive view of parenting helps avoid the perpetuation of a system of family
law that focuses on white, heterosexual, and higher-income families.  The Princi-
ples also take a broader view and do not focus on marriage as a necessary attrib-
ute of parenting, although a comment suggests that marriage can be used as an
indication of a “full and permanent” commitment to a child.10  This expanded
view of “family” and the attention paid to functional, rather than formal, rela-
tionships are in accord with feminist concepts.  Feminists may disagree, how-
ever, about whether the Principles give sufficient control to the primary caretaker
parent and about the status of children.
Part II of this commentary addresses the complexity of stepfamilies in or-
der to provide a framework in which to consider the ALI proposals.  Part III ex-
plains the terms that are important to understanding the Principles’ application
to stepfamilies, and Part IV tests that application on different stepfamily struc-
tures.  Part V provides a brief feminist assessment of the application of the new
parenting proposals to stepfamilies.  This commentary concludes that, on bal-
ance, the Principles meet a number of feminist goals.
6. Id. § 2.04
7. The court may interview the child or appoint a lawyer or a guardian ad litem for the child,
but is not required to do so. Id. §§ 2.15-16. The preferences “of a child who has reached a specific
age” (which the state should establish) are to be taken into account in custody decision-making,
however.  ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.09(1)(b).
8. Many of the ALI rules discussed in this commentary apply to two other types of “parents”
the ALI identifies—men who functioned as parents while believing that they were the biological fa-
ther and  persons who functioned as parents from the child’s birth as part of a co-parenting agree-
ment.  Id. § 2.03.  The case law and rationale for these two types are sufficiently different from the
more typical stepfamily form that they are not included in this commentary.
9. Sociologist Andrew Cherlin suggests defining stepfamily “as a household in which: 1) two
adults are married or cohabiting, and 2) at least one adult has a child present from a previous mar-
riage or relationship.”  ANDREW J. CHERLIN, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FAMILIES 404 (2d ed. 1999).
10. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.03 cmt. b(iv).  The Principles do not use the term “step-
family” or “stepparent” except in the comments and in that context it appears to mean married cou-
ples.  See ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.21 cmt. b; see also ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, §
3.02A cmt. b.
RAMSEY - FMT.DOC 09/20/01  9:28 AM
CONSTRUCTING PARENTHOOD FOR STEPPARENTS 287
II.  STEPFAMILIES
An estimated twenty-five percent of today’s children will become part of a
stepfamily by marriage.11  This percentage would be even greater and would in-
clude more families from marginalized groups if the broader definition of step-
families (including unmarried couples) were used.  Family formation patterns
often differ by race.  Whites fit more readily into the traditional stepfamily defi-
nition, compared to African-Americans, for example, because Whites are more
likely to remarry after divorce.12  Additionally, low-income mothers are often
unmarried,13 and gay and lesbian couples are prevented from marrying. Much of
what we currently know about stepfamilies is based on research that uses the
traditional definition.
Stepfamilies come in a variety of forms.  Consider the variation in family
connections that result from the relationships in the hypothetical case of Sue and
John.  Sue and John lived together for three years and had one child, Ann.  They
split up when Ann was two and thereafter Ann primarily lived with Sue, but
spent time with John as well.  A year later, John married Roseanne, who had
two daughters from a prior relationship who lived with her.  Ann saw John
about once a month after his marriage, and usually saw him with his new family
around.  The next year Sue married Frank, who was the custodial parent of his
ten year-old daughter Mary.  A year later, they had a son, Bill.  Ann now has a
stepmother, stepfather, a half-brother and three stepsisters.  She primarily lives
with her mother, stepfather, half-brother and one stepsister and sees her father,
stepmother and other two stepsisters occasionally.
Our hypothetical family is unusual in several respects.  Unlike Frank, most
divorced fathers are not the custodial parents.14  Ann’s continued contact with
her father is also unusual.  More often than not, the noncustodial father fades
out of the child’s life.15  Recent studies have noted only a slight increase in the
post-divorce involvement of fathers.16  Additional information about how step-
families function is needed, but family researchers have had difficulty studying
stepfamilies because of the complexity of these family forms.17
Researchers have tried to develop typologies for the structural variations in
stepfamilies. 18  For example, one researcher identified fifteen stepfamily configu-
rations based on the residence of a new two-parent family with children from
prior unions of both adults. This number of configurations doubled when the
11. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current Status of Divorce in the United States, 4
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 29, 35 (Spring 1994), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org.
12. Id. at 32.
13. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE  92 (1992).
14. Patricia H. Shiono and Linda Sandham Quinn, Epidemiology of Divorce, 4 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 15, 25 (Spring 1994), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org.
15. Id.
16. FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES 36 (1991).
17. For surveys of research: See Marilyn Coleman et al., Reinvestigating Remarriage:Another Dec-
ade of Progress, 62 J. OF MARRIAGE & THE FAM. 1288 (2000); Kay Pasley et al., Remarriage and Stepfami-
lies: Making Progress in Understanding, in STEPPARENTING: ISSUES IN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
PRACTICE 1 (Kay Pasley & Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman eds., 1994).
18. LAWRENCE H. GANONG & MARILYN COLEMAN, REMARRIED FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 5 (1994).
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new couple had children together. 19  In addition to variations in stepfamily
structure, psychological definitions of stepfamily membership vary as well.  One
study asked stepchildren to identify the members of their family.  The children’s
responses fell into four groups: some children identified their biological parents
as part of their family, but not the stepparent with whom they lived; some re-
placed the nonresidential biological parent with a stepparent; some only identi-
fied the biological parent with whom they lived; and others listed both biologi-
cal parents and at least one stepparent. 20
The complexity of stepfamilies may be one reason why stepfamilies, family
researchers and lawmakers have struggled to find a model that fits their family
form.  Even naming step-relationships is a challenge, in part because of the
negative connotations of the prefix “step.”  Stepparents’ labels have included
half-parents, added parents and acquired parents.21  Within a stepfamily a child
may call a stepparent “Mom” or “Dad” or use a first name.  Stepfamilies are la-
beled as reconstituted, combined, merged, blended and remarried.22  A re-
searcher studying lesbian stepfamilies rejected the term “stepfamily,” in favor of
using “step” as an adjective because  she felt that “lesbian” and “step” defined
the type of family being studied, but that “stepfamily” suggested something
other than family.23
Judges, family researchers, and stepfamilies themselves have been affected
by the power of the nuclear family model and too often use a deficit-comparison
approach when assessing stepfamilies.24  Instead of analyzing the stepfamily as a
new family form, they view the stepfamily as a deviation from the norm.  The
nuclear family is considered positive and any variation from it is considered
negative.
Stepfamilies may try to escape the stigma of being a stepfamily by being as
much like a “proper” family as possible.  Ironically, this may be counterproduc-
tive and will produce more family stress.  From a clinician’s standpoint, the
stepfamily that tries to be like a nuclear family must engage in “massive denial
and distortion of reality.” 25  “It is as if stepfamily members are asked to wipe the
slate clean, to forget about prior relationships, and to begin as if nothing that
went on before the remarriage actually happened.”26  Moreover, the stepfamily
that tries to emulate the nuclear family can encounter resistance both within and
outside the stepfamily.  A stepchild, for example, may reject the stepparent as
“parent” in turn provoking withdrawal by the stepparent.27  The noncustodial
parent may resist being replaced by the stepparent.28  Particularly with older
19. See ESTHER WALD, THE REMARRIED FAMILY: CHALLENGE AND PROMISE (1981), cited in
GANONG & COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 5.
20. See P.E. Gross, Defining Postdivorce Remarriage Families: A Typology Based on the Subjective Per-
ceptions of Children, 10 J. OF DIVORCE 205 (1987), cited in GANONG & COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 7.
21. GANONG & COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 2.
22. Id. at 1.
23. JANET M. WRIGHT, LESBIAN STEP FAMILIES: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF LOVE 3 (1998).
24. GANONG & COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 148.
25. Id.  at 124.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 125.
28. Id.
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children, the stepparent may be accepted more readily as an adult friend, rather
than as a “parent.”
In addition to the problem of stigma, another reason stepfamilies try to
emulate the nuclear family model is that the nuclear family is a known entity
with rules and boundaries.  In contrast, the stepfamily is a complex family sys-
tem that lacks a coherent, socially accepted model.  This lack of formalized so-
cietal support or incomplete institutionalization has been suggested as an expla-
nation for the slightly higher divorce rate for remarriages as compared to first
marriages.29  Clinicians have also attributed stepfamily stress to the lack of in-
stitutionalized societal support including customs, choice of language and law.30
They have also suggested that the lack of a legal relationship between a steppar-
ent and stepchild is a barrier to the development of a close relationship and adds
to the stepparent’s feeling of ambiguity and lack of control.31
The degree of the law’s impact on stepfamilies has been questioned,32 but it
is useful to speculate as to whether the Principles would help reduce this ambi-
guity.  Of course, it is important to note that the Principles address separation or
dissolution and do not directly establish new rules for an on-going family.  The
Principles’ influence on societal attitudes toward parent and stepparent roles in
an on-going relationship would be through an indirect response to the clearer
definitions of roles at the end of the relationship.
As this discussion of stepfamilies demonstrates, developing rules that
would be responsive to their diverse family forms at separation or dissolution is
a formidable challenge.  The next two sections of this commentary analyze how
the Principles addressed this challenge.
III.  DEFINING PARENTING AT SEPARATION OR DISSOLUTION
A. Responsibility Rather than Rights
Traditionally state law defines and allocates custody and visitation rights
between parents.  The Principles took a new approach, changing from an alloca-
tion of parental rights in children to an allocation of responsibility for children.
New terminology accompanies this new paradigm.  The Principles replace the
traditional terms of “custody” and “visitation” with the term “custodial respon-
sibility;” and “legal custody” with “decision-making responsibility.”33  The
comments explain the rationale for this change.  Custodial responsibility:
29. Id. at 59.  See generally Andrew Cherlin, Remarriage as an Incomplete Institution, 84 AM. J. OF
SOC. 634 (1978).
30. GANONG & COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 134-36.
31. Id. at 136.
32. See David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law’s Perception of “Family” After
Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102, 126 (Stephan D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay
eds., 1990) (suggesting that much of the role confusion in stepfamiles is due to their complexity
rather than to the lack of legal rules).
33. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.03 (“(4) Custodial responsibility refers to physical
custodianship and supervision of a child. It usually includes, but does not necessarily require, resi-
dential or overnight responsibility.  (5) Decisionmaking responsibility refers to authority for making
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is intended to avoid the either-or (custody or visitation) alternatives suggested
by more conventional terminology, and to reinforce the notion not only primary
responsibility for the child but also all other forms of physical responsibility as
well are custodial in nature.  While the effects of shifts in terminology on peo-
ple’s perceptions of parenthood are, at best, highly speculative, the unified con-
cept of custodial responsibility may help to strengthen the notion that both par-
ents have responsibility for the child, regardless of the proportion of time each
spends with the child, and that neither should be a mere ‘visitor.’34
The term “decisionmaking responsibility” is used to describe the authority to
make significant decisions about the child, such as decisions concerning medical
care or education.  The phrase “allocation of responsibility” includes both deci-
sionmaking and custodial time.35
B. Parenting Roles
The Principles distinguish between caretaking and parenting functions, a
distinction that follows traditional gender roles to a large extent.  Caretaking
functions “are tasks that involve interaction with the child or direct the interac-
tion and care provided by others” and  include such tasks as feeding and bath-
ing the child, providing moral guidance, and arranging for education, health
care, and daycare.36  These are traditionally the mother’s tasks and both custo-
dial mothers and wives of custodial fathers tend to follow this pattern, although
one study found that household labor in remarried families was less gender-
specific than in first-marriage families.37  Parenting functions “are tasks that
serve the needs of the child or the child’s residential family.” 38  They include
caretaking functions and additional tasks such as providing economic support,
home and car maintenance, housecleaning, and purchasing groceries.
The category of caretaking functions is used to allocate custodial responsi-
bility when parents cannot agree.  The allocation standard adopted by the Prin-
ciples is that the court “should be required to allocate custodial responsibility so
that the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent ap-
proximates the proportion of time each parent spends performing caretaking
functions for the child prior to the parents’ separation or, if the parents never
lived together, before the filing of the action. . .” subject to certain qualifications,
including the need “to avoid substantial and almost certain harm to the child.”39
This approximation standard “assumes that the division of past caretaking
functions correlates well with other factors associated with the child’s best inter-
ests, such as the quality of each parent’s emotional attachment to the child and
the parents’ respective parenting abilities.” 40
significant life decisions on behalf of the child, including the child’s education, spiritual guidance,
and health care. “).
34. Id. § 2.03 cmt. d.
35. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.21.
36. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.03 (6).
37. GANONG & COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 65.
38. See ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.03(7).
39. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.09(1).
40. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.09 cmt. b.
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The approximation standard is easy to criticize: for example, one attorney
complained that “the premise of the ALI Principles that “primary caretaking”
correlates to a deeper emotional attachment between that parent and the child is
flawed.  Parent-child relationships cannot be so simplistically quantified.”41  This
critique does not take into account the additional major justification for the
standard, which is that it is more objective and  easier to apply than a require-
ment that a court determine parenting abilities and emotional attachment be-
tween parent and child.
The Principles also assume that contact with each parent is desirable even if
one parent did not perform many caretaking functions.  In making a custodial
allocation therefore the court should “permit the child to have a relationship
with each parent.” 42  The amount of time allocated should be enough to allow “a
meaningful relationship.”43  When a parent “has performed a reasonable share of
parenting functions” the custodial allocation “should not be less than a pre-
sumptive amount of custodial time determined through a uniform rule of state-
wide application.”44  The Principles do provide for limitations on a custodial allo-
cation when necessary to prevent harm to the child or the child’s parent in
situations involving child abuse, domestic abuse and other problems.45
The caretaking concept and the importance of maintaining parenting conti-
nuity for the child are important in determining who qualifies as a parent as
well.  The next section explains the new concepts of “parent.”
C. Who Is a Parent?
The Principles have three categories of “parent”—legal parents, parents by es-
toppel, and de facto parents.46  A legal parent is one who is defined as such under
state law.  Decisions that turn on who fits the state definition of parent, such as
the familiar Supreme Court decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D,47 would not be af-
fected by the Principles.  Michael H. involved a child born to a married couple
who was not the biological child of the husband.  Michael, the biological father
of Victoria, was not a “parent” under California law because Victoria was pre-
sumed to be the child of her mother’s husband.  Under the Principles, therefore,
Michael would not be a legal parent.48
The category of parent by estoppel prevents a legal parent from denying pa-
rental status to a person who has acted as a parent in specified ways. 49  A person
41. Henry Shanoski, Two Parents for Every Child of Divorce: Sustaining the Shared Parenting Ideal of
Maine’s Custody Law, 14 ME. B. J. 86, 88 (1999).
42. See ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.09(1)(a).
43. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.09 cmt. a
44. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.09(1)(a).
45. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.13.
46. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.03(1).
47. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
48. A person in Michael’s position might be able to achieve a parent by estoppel or de facto parent
status, if he met the stringent requirements for one of these categories.  Michael did not, however,
because his cohabitation with Victoria and her mother was relatively brief and intermittent.  He did
not even meet the threshold requirement of having lived with Victoria for at least two years.  ALI
PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.03(1).
49. Id. § 2.03 cmt. b.
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who has met the Principles’ parent by estoppel requirements is treated like a legal
parent in the allocation of custodial and decisionmaking responsibility.50  A par-
ent by estoppel, for example, has standing to bring an action and the advantages
of the presumptions in favor of a minimum allocation of custodial time and a
joint allocation of decisionmaking responsibility.51  The Principles provide four
approaches to becoming a parent by estoppel: 1) being liable for child support; 2)
having a good faith belief that one is the biological father; 3) entering into a co-
parenting agreement prior to the child’s birth; and 4) living “with the child for at
least two years, holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as
a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child’s parent (or, if there are two
legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that recognition as a parent is in
the child’s best interests.”52  This last approach is the one that is primarily appli-
cable to the stepfamily form.
The definition of de facto parent is narrow “to avoid unnecessary and inap-
propriate intrusion into the relationships between legal parents and their chil-
dren.”53  The person seeking de facto parent status must have lived with the child
for a significant period of time, not less than two years.  Whether a time period
is “significant” depends on a number of factors, including “the age of the child,
the frequency of contact, and the intensity of the relationship.”54  In addition,
during this time period, for reasons not based primarily on financial compensa-
tion, the person must have performed a majority of the caretaking functions or a
share that is at least equal to the share assumed by the legal parent with whom
the child primarily lived.  The practical effect of this requirement is that gener-
ally the only stepparent who might become a de facto parent is the partner of the
parent with primary custodial responsibility. The de facto parent status is inferior
to legal parent and parent by estoppel status.  A de facto parent typically would not
be allocated primary custodial responsibility when a legal parent has also been
taking an active parenting role, for example.55
As with the category of parent by estoppel, the consent of a legal parent is a
prerequisite for the formation of the de facto parent relationship.  Consent can be
implied, but requires a clear demonstration that the legal parent intended to
share parenting responsibilities.  If the legal parent maintains control over mat-
ters related to the child’s care, such as discipline, then the parent typically has
not agreed to share responsibilities.  Asking a partner to babysit, for example,
does not establish an agreement to a de facto parent relationship.56  De facto parent
status can also be established without a parent’s consent, if no legal parent is able
or willing to perform caretaking functions as, for example, when a parent aban-
doned a child or was institutionalized.
Generally a person who is not a “parent” under any of these categories
would not be allocated any responsibility.  In other words, there is no equivalent
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(i-iv).
53. Id. § 2.03 cmt c.
54. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.03 cmt. c(iv.)
55. Id. § 2.21 cmt. b.
56. Id. § 2.03 cmt. c(iii.).
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to a broad visitation statute.  A “grandparent or other relative” may be allocated
responsibility but only in a very narrow range of cases.57  Note that a stepparent
might not qualify as an “other relative.” This restrictive approach “reflect[s] the
societal consensus that responsibility for children ordinarily should be retained
by a child’s parents, while recognizing that there are some exceptional circum-
stances in which the child’s needs are best served by continuity of care by other
adults.”58  A further restriction is that a person who did not qualify as a legal par-
ent, parent by estoppel, or de facto parent would not have standing to bring an in-
dependent action, although in exceptional circumstances a court can permit in-
tervention in an on-going action.59
D. Support
The Principles do not impose a general obligation of support on stepparents
nor does the allocation of responsibility trigger a support obligation.  Child sup-
port and the responsibility allocation are considered separately.60  A stepparent
who received a small allocation of responsibility would be expected to care for
the child as a volunteer and would not be entitled to support from a parent,
however. 61  Some scholars, statutes, and cases suggest that visitation and sup-
port should be connected so that a stepparent who wanted continued contact
with a child would also be expected to continue to assist in the child’s support. 62
If a stepparent’s affirmative behavior is such that the stepparent should be
equitably estopped from denying a support obligation, a support obligation may
be imposed. 63  These cases would be rare and a stepparent’s sharing of resources
during the relationship does not provide a basis for ordering support.64  If a child
support obligation is imposed, the stepparent becomes a parent by estoppel.65  The
child’s legal parent can avoid this result by not pursuing the child support claim,
but once a stepparent is obligated for support, the stepparent has parent by estop-
pel status, with its attendant rights and privileges.
IV.  APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
In custody cases, state courts have used a variety of equitable doctrines and
sometimes vague and open-ended standards to allow stepparents and partners
to continue their relationship with a child.66  The ALI proposals would clarify the
basis for recognizing those claims and would be more stringent than the ap-
57. Id. § 2.21(2)(i-iii).
58. Id. § 2.21 cmt. a.
59. Id. § 2.04 (e).
60. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 3.02A cmt. b.
61. Id. §3.17 cmt. c.
62. See, e.g., Sarah H. Ramsey & Judith M. Masson, Stepparent Support of Stepchildren: A Compara-
tive Analysis of Policies and Problems in the American and English Experience, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 659,
671-72 (1985); In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
6-303(a) (1996).
63. See ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 3.02A.
64. Id. § 3.02A cmt. b.
65. See id. §§ 2.03(1)(b)(i), 3.02A cmt. e.
66. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Reporter’s Notes, ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, at 228-32.
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proach taken by some states, but more lenient than other states.  Looking at the
facts of some of these cases and applying the Principles provides a mechanism
for seeing how the new rules would operate in practice.
A. Death of Custodial Parent
A.R.A. was born two years before her parents’ marriage ended. 67  Her
mother, Tracy, received custody and remarried a year later.  She and her new
husband had a child, Joshua, and their marriage continued for two years until
she was killed in a plane crash. Tracy’s will named her husband Patrick as
A.R.A.’s guardian.  A.R.A.’s father, Bill, had moved to another state, but visited
A.R.A. for “extended periods” approximately once per year and kept in touch
by telephone.  He was delinquent in his child support payments, however.  The
trial court awarded custody to Patrick based on A.R.A.’s best interests.  The dis-
trict court found:
there was a close relationship between Patrick and A.R.A.; that A.R.A. was at-
tached to her brother Joshua; that Patrick’s parenting skills are superior to those
possessed by Bill; that A.R.A. would be adversely affected by changing schools,
therapists, and her primary residence; and that it was in her best interest that
she remain in Billings in the family unit to which she had grown accustomed.68
The Montana Supreme Court reversed and held that the trial court did not have
the authority “to deprive a natural parent of his or her constitutionally protected
rights absent a finding of abuse and neglect or dependency.”69
What would the result be under the Principles?  Patrick met many of the re-
quirements for parent by estoppel.  He lived with A.R.A. for at least two years and
he likely accepted “full and permanent responsibilities as a parent” with Tracy’s
consent, because he and Tracy supported A.R.A., and she named him as guard-
ian.  Tracy, however, cannot unilaterally confer parent by estoppel status on Pat-
rick either during her lifetime or through her will.  Bill must also consent, be-
cause “[a] parent cannot be estopped from denying parent status to an
individual who has functioned as such, if that parent has not agreed.” 70 A par-
ent’s consent can be implied from the circumstances, however: “[f]or example,
the legal father who knows that his child is being raised entirely by the mother
and her husband and who fails to visit or support the child has agreed, con-
structively, to the stepfather’s role as the child’s parent, and is estopped from
later denying parental status to that stepfather.  In contrast, the legal father who
acknowledges the stepfather’s role but who continues to exercise his own pa-
rental rights and responsibilities has not agreed to the formation of a parent
status by the stepfather.”71  Did Bill give implied consent?  This presents a diffi-
cult question since he did stay in touch with A.R.A., perhaps as much as he
could because of the geographical separation, but he did not financially support
her.
67. See generally In re A.R.A., 919 P.2d 388, 389 (Mont. 1996).
68. Id. at 390.
69. Id. at 392.
70. See ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.03 cmt. b(iv).
71. Id.
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If Patrick is not a parent by estoppel is he at least a de facto parent?  The case
did not discuss who performed the caretaking functions for A.R.A.  In order for
Patrick to be a de facto parent, he would have to perform at least as much care-
taking as Tracy did.  If they followed fairly traditional roles, it is unlikely that he
did so.  Probably the result under the Principles will be the same as that reached
by the Montana court.  Patrick does not fit the pattern and is out of the picture.72
Can A.R.A. and her half-brother have continued contact?  The Principles
make no provision for this.  A.R.A. would have no standing to initiate an action
and the provisions for allocating responsibility apply to adults only.  No protec-
tion is provided for child-child relationships, only for parent-child relationships.
An ironic effect of the shift of language from rights to responsibility is that the
child’s position as subject of a proceeding, rather than as participant, is empha-
sized.  At least in rights talk, a child, as well as a parent, can assert a right to
continued contact with persons in her family.73
B. Dissolution of the Relationship
When Scott and Judy Hickenbottom married, she had a daughter from a
prior marriage who was about four years old.74  Scott lived with his stepdaugh-
ter for almost eight years until he and Judy decided to divorce.  Scott and Judy
also had two sons which were born during the marriage.  According to Scott, his
stepdaughter’s father had no contact with her and paid no child support.  Scott,
however, had a father-daughter relationship with her.  She called him “Daddy”
and was known by his surname.  He disciplined her, attended school functions,
prepared meals for her and put her to bed.  Judy objected at trial to giving Scott
visitation with his stepdaughter, stating that:
I just want to get on with it.  I don’t want him coming and going when he
pleases, you know.  She was already abandoned, left—I wouldn’t say aban-
doned, but left by one father. I don’t need it by a second father.  I won’t tolerate
it from him.  And his harassment, I won’t tolerate it.75
The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the trial court’s visitation award, stating
that Scott had met the requirement of acting as a parent to the child and had
achieved an in loco parentis status.76  The court concluded that:
[T]he wife is more interested in punishing the husband by denying him access
to her daughter than she is in doing what serves the girl’s best interests.  The girl
72. Some states would give Patrick rights. See, e.g., Tailor v. Becker, 708 A.2d 626, 627 (Del. 1998)
(upholding statute that “effectively gives a stepparent the same status as a natural parent, for pur-
poses of deciding custody, if (i) the child is residing with the stepparent and a natural custodial par-
ent, when (ii) the natural custodial parent dies or becomes disabled.”).
73. For example, in Michael H., Victoria asserted a right, albeit unsuccessful, to have continued
contact with both her “fathers.”  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-32 (1989).
74. Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Neb. 1991).  Hickenbottom addresses an
additional issue that this commentary does not cover, namely the effect of an agreement by the par-
ties related to custody.  Although the Nebraska court would not allow the parties’ agreement to
control the custodial disposition of the children, the Principles strongly support private agreements.
See ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, §§ 2.06, 2.07.
75. See Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d at 11.
76. Id. at 17.
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is not a piece of property; she is a living, breathing, and, as is any child, fragile
person who is seemingly already distraught by the destruction of what she has
known as her family.  There is no need to further damage her by removing the
emotional support of one who has cared for her during the marriage.77
Under the Principles, Judy would have little basis for opposing Scott’s de-
sire for continued contact, because Scott would be a parent by estoppel.  Judy ap-
parently consented to Scott’s taking on full parental responsibilities and the
child’s father, through inaction, gave implied consent.  Scott took this role for a
significant period of time in relation to the child’s age and for more than two
years.  Finally, the court would probably find that giving parent by estoppel status
to Scott would be in the child’s best interests.  As a parent by estoppel, Scott and
Judy would be on an equal footing with regard to the allocation of responsibil-
ity.  Scott would also benefit from the presumptions in favor of an allocation of
joint decisionmaking responsibility and at least a minimum allocation of custo-
dial time.
In both A.R.A. and Hickenbottom, the conflict over the child involved only
two adults, a stepparent and biological parent, because the other biological par-
ent was either deceased or had disappeared from the child’s life.  The final case
this commentary considers is In re Marriage of Sorensen that involves a conflict
among three “parents.”78  The facts are as follows:
When the child was two years old, the marriage of her biological parents (father
and mother) was dissolved, and each was awarded joint custody of the child.
One month later, father married stepmother.  That marriage lasted for 11 years.
At the beginning of father and stepmother’s marriage, the child spent half her
time with mother and half her time with father and stepmother.  However,
when she turned six, the child began residing with father and stepmother and
spending less time with mother. That arrangement continued for three years.
Between the ages of 10 and 12, mother’s involvement with the child diminished
even further, with the child having few overnight visits with mother.  Over the
years, stepmother and the child have developed a very close relationship, with
stepmother assuming a primary parenting role.  Stepmother has been responsi-
ble for making the major decisions that affect the child and for assisting with her
education.  She has helped feed, clothe, shelter, discipline, obtain medical care
and provide emotional support for the child.  Still, the child has at all times re-
ferred to her biological mother as “mom” and continues to have a good relation-
ship with her.  Mother and father continue to share joint legal custody of the
child.
After father and stepmother’s recent divorce, the child continued to reside with
father.  Stepmother moved to a nearby residence to facilitate visitations with the
child.  She and father had a verbal agreement that the child would be allowed to
spend an unlimited amount of time with stepmother, and that she would have
the freedom to go back and forth between the households as she pleased.  Step-
mother alleges that within two months, father decided not to abide by that
agreement and began making it difficult for stepmother to see the child.79
77. Id.
78. 906 P.2d 838 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
79. Id. at 839.
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The issue confronting the appellate court was whether the stepmother had
standing to intervene in a proceeding that mother initiated against father for
custody of the child.  The court found that she did have standing to intervene
and remanded the case to the trial court for a decision on the merits of the step-
mother’s claim.
Under the Principles, it appears that the stepmother would be a de facto par-
ent and hence would have standing not only to intervene in an action, but also to
initiate an action.80  The father apparently consented to her forming a parent-
child bond with the daughter and she performed a majority of the caretaking
functions.  But the stepmother would probably still not be a parent by estoppel be-
cause the mother did not consent to the stepmother having full rights and re-
sponsibilities of a parent, nor could her consent be implied.  As noted earlier,
“the legal [parent] who acknowledges the [stepparent’s] role but who continues
to exercise [her] own parental rights and responsibilities has not agreed to the
formation of a parent status by the [stepparent].” 81  As a de facto parent, the
stepmother would not have a status equal to either the mother or the father in
the court’s decision allocating responsibility.  A court should not allocate the
majority of custodial responsibility to a de facto parent over the objection of a legal
parent unless the legal parent had “not been performing a reasonable share of
parenting functions” or “the available alternatives would cause harm to the
child. 82  Even if the stepmother performed a majority of the caretaking func-
tions, there is no evidence that father did not perform other parenting functions,
such as providing support for the family, and thus he probably met the “reason-
able share” requirement.
If the court were inclined to allocate responsibility among the stepmother,
father and mother, the court might be concerned about whether doing so would
result in too many “parents” in the life of the child.  The Principles provide that
the court should “limit or deny an allocation otherwise to be made if, in light of
the number of other individuals to be allocated responsibility, the allocation
would be impractical in light of the objectives of this Chapter”83 (the primary
objective of the Chapter is “to serve the child’s best interests.”)84 In making this
allocation determination a judge should recognize that the Principles intended to
expand the concept of “parent” and allow more than two “parents.”  Sorensen
seems an appropriate case for applying this expanded concept of family.  To put
it differently, if a court concluded that the stepmother in Sorensen should receive
no allocation, because such an allocation would result in too many “parents,” it
would be vitiating the Principles’ expanded concept of parent.
A similar analysis would be applicable to a gay stepfamily.  To use a hy-
pothetical case, Ann and Mary decide to have a child together and have a co-
parenting agreement.  Ann is the biological mother and Mary is a parent by es-
80. See ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.04(1)(c).
81. Id. § 2.03 cmt. b(iv).  See also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
82. Id. § 2.21(1)(a)(i-iii).
83. Id. § 2.21(1)(b).
84. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02.
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toppel.85  Ann and Mary separate three years after the child is born.  The child
stays primarily with Ann, but Mary continues an active parenting role.  Ann de-
velops a new relationship after a year and her new partner, Alice, takes an active
parenting role, providing as much caretaking as Ann does over the course of
their five-year relationship.  When Ann and Alice separate, a court could allo-
cate responsibility among Ann, a legal parent, Mary, a parent by estoppel, and Al-
ice, a de facto parent.
V.  FEMINIST GOALS
Do the Principles further feminist goals?  Feminists share a commitment to
examining law reform proposals to determine whether their impact on women
helps eliminate the disadvantage that law has traditionally imposed on
women.86  Examining the Principles’ impact on stepfamilies, however, runs into
the problem that there is no “essential” woman nor is there an “essential” step-
family.  Women take a variety of parenting roles and stepfamilies have a num-
ber of different structures.  A law that strengthens the position of one woman or
stepfamily may weaken the position of another.  A rule that helped a custodial
mother prevent a former partner from having continued contact with her child,
for example, might also prevent a stepmother from maintaining her relationship
with a child she has parented.
Considered generally, the Principles contain a number of feminist concepts.
Feminists have favored expanded definitions of the family that are tied more to
function than to formal, legal definitions of connection87 and enhanced recogni-
tion of the importance of caring for children.  The parent by estoppel and de facto
parent proposals provide a cautious mechanism for recognizing expanded, in-
formal family forms and moving beyond the constraints of the nuclear family
model.  Parental status is not exclusively tied to biology, adoption or marriage,
but rather is also related to function.  Children are not limited to two “parents,”
but instead can have legally protected relationships with additional persons
who performed substantial parenting roles.  The Principles also provide recogni-
tion of the importance of caretaking and use it as a means for assessing an
adult’s connection and commitment to a child.  One troubling aspect of the Prin-
ciples is that children are rendered relatively invisible as individuals, although
their well being is considered to be the basis for many of the Principles’ decision
rules.
With regard to maternal roles within a family and custody decisionmaking,
feminists do not share a common view of what constitutes disadvantage.  Some
are equal parent advocates who encourage mothers and fathers to share par-
enting tasks and labor force participation equally.88  Others are maternalists who
85. See ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.03 (If Mary adopted the child, she would be a legal
parent.).  Id. § 2.03 cmt. a.
86. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L. Q. 475 (1999).
87. Id. at 486-87.
88. See Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment?  Do Feminists Need Equality?, 9 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 297 (1998) (“Equal treatment” feminists “embrace equal parenting
strategies designed to destabilize domesticity’s gender roles” and “special treatment” feminists “ad-
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want women’s childrearing and other traditional work given increased recogni-
tion to support women who take this traditional role.89  The maternalists would
support enhancing the authority of the primary caretaker parent.  They might
disagree with the result in A.R.A. on the basis that Tracy’s decision to make her
husband a “parent” should have prevailed over the preference of Bill, the bio-
logical father.  Equal parent advocates might be less disturbed by A.R.A.  If Pat-
rick, the stepfather, had taken an equal parenting role with Tracy he would be a
de facto parent even if Bill had taken an active role as well.  As a de facto parent he
could have received an allocation of responsibility even over Bill’s objection.  If
Bill had not taken an active role, Patrick would be a parent by estoppel.  Thus, the
allocation of responsibility between Patrick and Bill depends upon the level of
their parenting activities.
Maternalists might also disagree with the result in Hickenbottom.  They
might support Judy’s desire to return to the mother-child dyad and agree with
her skepticism regarding Scott’s long-term commitment to the child.  They
might view Scott’s parenting activities with skepticism as well, considering the
court’s attention to his caretaking to be more related to the use of a dual stan-
dard in assessing parenting—taking Judy’s work for granted, as something that
was expected, and giving Scott undue credit for performing minimal, though
unexpected, caretaking tasks.
Equal parent advocates, however, might find the Hickenbottom court’s con-
clusion more acceptable.  Scott took an active role, with his wife’s consent and
encouragement.  Recognizing his contribution and allowing him to continue his
relationship with the daughter does not seem unfair to Judy, since she agreed to
his taking on this role.  They might, however, feel that the harassment complaint
should have been considered seriously with the court proactively determining if
domestic abuse had occurred.  If it had, under the Principles, Scott’s allocation of
responsibility could be limited.90
Sorensen presents a more difficult case because of the conflict between the
biological mother and the primary caretaker, the stepmother.  A straightforward
application of the maternalists’ approach presumably would give the most
authority to the stepmother and thus would disapprove of classifying her as
only a de facto parent.91  On the other hand, since the biological mother also took
an active role, the maternalists might feel uncomfortable with reducing her
authority relative to the stepmother.  Equal parent advocates might disapprove
of the result produced by applying the Principles as well, because the parent who
performed the most caretaking functions, the stepmother, ends up with a lower
priority than the two legal parents.  Sorensen demonstrates the importance of legal
parenthood in the Principles’ allocation structure.  This deference to legal par-
vocate maternalist policies designed to empower women within the role domesticity assigns to
them.”).
89. Id.  See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133 (1992).
90. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.13.
91. Mary Becker might disagree because of her focus on the importance of pregnancy, child-
birth and nursing.  She also recognizes, however, that women without a genetic link to a child can
have an important mothering role. See Becker, supra note 89, at 220.
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enthood does not clearly meet the goals of the maternalists or equal parent ad-
vocates, although it may reflect the majority view.92  The attention to function as
well as formality, however, would be a positive feminist contribution. 
The Principles support flexibility in family forms by acknowledging norms
that the family chose rather than prescribing a model family form.  In addition
to the problems noted above, assessing the impact of this approach on women is
difficult because of differences in women’s ability to control their family struc-
ture.  A woman’s freedom of choice in a relationship may be illusory because of
economic necessity or because she is dominated by her husband or partner.
Mothers may not be able to prevent their partners from taking a parenting role
even though they view that involvement as undesirable. There is some evidence
that women marry because of financial need or social pressure to create a
“proper” family for their children.93  Their caretaking ability may be constrained
by the workplace as well.  Conversely, researchers have found that remarried
women are relatively more powerful than women in first marriages in areas
such as decision-making and financial control.94  It seems safe to assume, how-
ever, that some custodial mothers who did not freely chose to confer parental
status on their partners, will nonetheless be required to share responsibility
upon separation.
VI.  CONCLUSION
With regard to childrearing and custody, the Principles do not impose the
equal parenting model or the maternalists’ model on stepfamilies, but rather al-
low those functioning as parents to make this choice within fairly constrained
boundaries.  As noted earlier, the noncustodial parent’s partner would probably
not be able to meet the parenting function requirements of the Principles and
hence could not achieve parent by estoppel or de facto parent status.  Furthermore,
achieving a de facto parent status is contingent on the express or implied consent
of a parent.  For a stepparent to become a parent by estoppel, the consent of both
legal parents is needed, unless the stepparent is liable for child support, and the
recognition of the status must be in the child’s best interest.95  The Principles thus
provide strong support for legal parents’ control, although the rules are more lib-
eral than those of states that require a showing of parental unfitness before a
nonparent’s claims are recognized.
Although these are important concerns, the Principles further feminist goals
by emphasizing function rather than formality and the importance of providing
care for children.  The Principles allow space for establishing new norms for step-
families, and for letting these families determine their structure.  It is a narrow
space, however, limited by deference to parental control.  On balance the Princi-
ples are a positive, incremental step toward recognizing families that do not fit
the nuclear family model.
92. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.21 cmt. a.
93. GANONG & COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 39.
94. Id. at 64.
95. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 4, § 2.03 (b)(iv).
